Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is ubiquitous in today's world. The behavior of dynamic code can depend on the logic of the dynamic code generator in subtle and non-obvious ways, with significant security implications, e.g., JIT compiler bugs can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities in the resulting JIT-compiled code. Existing approaches to program analysis do not provide adequate support for reasoning about such behavioral relationships. This paper takes a first step in addressing this problem by describing a program representation and a new notion of dependency that allows us to reason about dependency and information flow relationships between the dynamic code generator and the generated dynamic code. Experimental results show that analyses based on these concepts are able to capture properties of dynamic code that cannot be identified using traditional program analyses.
INTRODUCTION
Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is ubiquitous in today's world. Such code arises in many contexts, including JIT-compilation, dynamic binary translation, obfuscation, and dynamic code unpacking in malware. Dynamic code raises new security challenges, arising partly from the fact that the behavior of an application containing dynamic code may depend in part on logic that is not part of the application itself, but rather is in the dynamic code generator. As a concrete example, Rabet describes a JIT compiler bug in Chrome's V8 JavaScript engine that causes some initialization code in the application program to be (incorrectly) optimized away, resulting in an exploitable vulnerability (CVE-2017-5121) [35] . As another example, Frassetto et al. describe how a memory corruption vulnerability can be used to modify the byte code of an interpreted program such that subsequent JIT compilation results in the creation of the malicious payload [15] . As these examples suggest, vulnerabilities arising from dynamic code generation pose a significant security challenge [33, 40] . To deal with such situations, it would be helpful to be able to start from some appropriate point in the dynamically generated code-e.g., an instruction that crashes as a result of the bug, or is part of the exploit code-and trace dependencies back, into and through the JIT compiler's code, to help identify the bug that caused incorrect code to be generated or the byte code to be corrupted. The key here is to be able to reason about dependencies and information flow between the dynamic code generator and the dynamically generated code so that we can try to determine how the behavior of the generated code is influenced by that of the code generator. Such analyses, which we refer to as end-to-end analyses, can significantly speed up the process of identifying and fixing such problems. Other examples of security issues arising from dynamic code, which can also benefit from end-to-end analysis, include evasion based on environmental triggers, where the dynamic code generator generates different code based on different environmental values.
Unfortunately, existing approaches to (static or dynamic) program analysis do not adequately support such reasoning about dynamic code modification. Traditional program representations, such as control flow graphs, cannot handle the effects of runtime changes to the code, which require accommodating the possibility of some memory locations having different instructions at different times during execution. JIT compilers [16, 22] and dynamic binary translators [31] maintain representations of the code being dynamically modified, but not together with that of the code that performs code modification. Whole-system analyses [11, 14, 21, 45, 46] perform dynamic taint propagation, taking into account explicit information flows via data dependencies but not implicit flows via control dependencies. As we discuss later, they also do not take into account dependencies that can arise through the act of dynamic code modification. Thus, existing approaches to reasoning about program behaviors suffer from the following shortcomings:
(a) they do not provide program representations that allow us to even ask questions such as "What logic in the dynamic code generator affected the generation of the faulty application code?"; and (b) they do not support notions of dependence that can allow us to reason about the computation in ways that can help answer such questions.
This paper shows how this problem can be addressed via a program representation that is able to capture the structure and evolution of code that can change dynamically, together with a notion of dependency that arises from the process of dynamic code generation and which is not captured by conventional notions of data and control dependencies. Experimental results show that our ideas make it possible to reason about dynamic code in novel ways, e.g., we can construct backward dynamic program slices, starting from incorrect dynamically generated JIT-compiled code, to include the JIT-compiler logic responsible for the problem; and detect situations where a dynamic code generator embeds environmental triggers in dynamically generated code. Such end-to-end analyses are not possible using current approaches to program analysis.
BACKGROUND: CONTROL FLOW GRAPHS
Program analyses are based on representations of the program's structure; for concreteness, we focus on control flow graphs (CFGs). CFG construction for static code via static analysis is well-understood [2] . However, this approach is inadequate for dynamic code because code created at runtime is not available for static inspection; instead, we use dynamic analysis. This has the benefit of being able to handle dynamic code; its drawback is that the constructed CFG may not contain all of the program's code due to incomplete code coverage. We sketch here how CFGs for static code can be constructed from an instruction trace obtained via dynamic analysis. The extension of this approach to dynamic code is discussed in Section 3.2. Let G denote the CFG under construction. We process instructions in the execution trace as they are encountered. For each instruction I , its properties (e.g., whether or not it is a control transfer) and its status within G (e.g., whether or not it is already in G) determine how it is processed; we refer to this as "processing I in the context of G. " If I has not been encountered previously, it is added as a new instruction. If I follows a conditional or unconditional jump, it should begin a basic block: thus, if I is currently in G and is not the first instruction of its block, the block has to be split and control flow edges added appropriately.
Multi-threading introduces additional complexity because adjacent instructions in the execution trace may be from different threads and thus may not represent adjacent instructions in the code. We handle this by tracking the construction of G across all threads, with each update happening according to the state of the current thread. By state, we mean that we separately maintain the call stack, previous instruction seen, current function being reconstructed, etc. for each thread (i.e. the last instruction from one thread may be appending an instruction to a basic block whereas a different thread could be splitting a different block).
REASONING ABOUT DYNAMIC CODE
Dynamic code modification can give rise to different versions of the program, with different instructions and behaviors, at different points in its execution. A representation suitable for end-to-end analysis of dynamic code should keep track of the different versions of the code resulting from dynamic modification. There are two issues to consider here: (1) what constitutes "dynamic code modification"? and (2) how should such modifications be captured in the program representation? We address these questions as follows. First, we note that in general, heuristic approaches, such as categorizing a memory write as code modification if it targets an executable section of the program's memory, may not be sufficiently precise, e.g., because permissions on memory pages can be changed during execution, making a non-executable memory region executable. We therefore consider a write to a memory location ℓ as "code modification" only if ℓ is part of some instruction that is subsequently executed. Second, even small dynamic code modifications can result in arbitrarily large changes to the program's representation and behavior. In the x86 ISA, for example, the arithmetic
first instruction modified in φ 1 Figure 1 : Phases instruction "bitwise or" (opcode: or; encoding: 0x0c) can, by flipping a single bit, be changed to the control transfer instruction "jump if equal" (opcode: je; encoding: 0x0f). Motivated by these observations, we build our program's CFG using dynamic analysis, as described in Section 2, until we encounter an instruction whose memory locations have been modified. At this point we are confronted with a potentially arbitrary change to the program's behavior and representation. To capture this, we begin construction of a new CFG, which we link to the previously constructed CFG using a special type of edge that we call a "dynamic edge. " Each such linked CFG corresponds to a "phase" of the program's execution. We make this notion more precise below.
Terminology. In some situations, it may make sense to distinguish between code created at runtime prior to being executed ("dynamic code generation") and code modified at runtime after it has already been executed ("dynamic code modification"). The ideas described here apply to both these situations, and we use the terms "generation" and "modification" of dynamic code interchangeably.
Concepts and Definitions
3.1.1 Phases. The idea behind phases is to partition an execution of a program into a sequence of fragments φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ i , . . . such that for each φ i , none of the locations written by the instructions in φ i is part of any instruction executed by φ i . Each φ i is referred to as a phase. Execution begins in phase φ 0 with the program's initial code. When the first dynamic instruction is encountered, we switch to φ 1 . Execution continues in φ 1 (including other instructions that may have been created or modified in φ 0 ) until an instruction is encountered that was modified in φ 1 , at which point we switch to φ 2 , and so on. This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
More formally, given a dynamic instance I of an instruction in a program, let instr_locs(I ) denote the set of locations occupied by I and write_locs(I ) the set of locations written by I . These notions extend in a straightforward way to a sequence of instructions S: A program execution's phases capture the different "versions" of code arising from dynamic code modification during that execution. An execution with no dynamic code consists of a single phase.
Dynamic Control Flow Graphs.
We use the notion of phases to construct control flow graphs for dynamic code: we construct a CFG for each phase of the execution, as discussed in Section 2, and link them together using special edges, called dynamic edges, that represent the control flow from the last instruction of one phase to the first instruction of the next phase. We refer to such a CFG as a dynamic control flow graph (DCFG). More formally: Definition 3.2. Given an execution trace T for a program, let Φ(T ) = φ 0 , . . . , φ n denote the phases of T , and let G i = (V i , E i ) denote the CFG constructed from the subtrace ϕ i . Then the dynamic control flow graph for T is given by G = (V , E), where: • V = n i=0 V i is the disjoint union of the sets of vertices V i of the individual phase CFGs G i ; and • E = ( n i=0 E i ) ∪ E dyn is the disjoint union of the sets of edges E i together with a set of dynamic edges E dyn defined as follows: E dyn = (last(φ i ), first(φ i+1 )), where last(φ i ) and first(φ i+1 ) denote, respectively, the basic blocks corresponding to the last instruction of φ i and the first instruction of φ i+1 . Example 3.3. Figure 2 gives a simple example of a DCFG. The static CFG of the program under consideration is shown in Figure  2 (a). When instruction I 2 is executed, it changes instruction I 1 to J 1 (indicated by the dashed red arrow), where J 1 is a conditional branch with possible successors I 3 and I 5 . The following is an execution trace for this program along with its phases:
Trace:
The first phase, φ 0 , consists of the instruction sequence I 0 , I 1 , I 2 , I 4 .
When control returns to the top of the loop at the end of this sequence, instruction I 1 is found to have been changed to J 1 . This ends φ 0 and begins φ 1 , which comprises the rest of the trace, J 1 , I 3 , I 4 , J 1 , I 5 . The CFGs corresponding to phases φ 0 and φ 1 in Figure 2 (b) are G 0 and G 1 respectively. Finally, the control transfer from φ 0 to φ 1 is indicated via a dynamic edge from the basic block of the last instruction of φ 0 to the basic block of the first instruction in φ 1 , i.e., from the block for I 4 in G 0 to the block for J 1 in G 1 .
The reader may notice, in Example 3.3, that the basic block containing I 4 occurs in both G 0 and G 1 . This illustrates a potential drawback of a naive implementation of DCFGs, namely, that CFG components may be replicated across different phases. It is possible to implement DCFGs to avoid such replication, but in this case it is important to ensure that algorithms that traverse the DCFG (e.g., for slicing) do not follow unrealizable paths. The details are orthogonal to the primary thrust of this paper and so are omitted; Section 5.2.2 briefly sketches the performance improvements we see from implementing sharing of DCFG components across phases. In this example, B is an instruction that adds an immediate value imm to the register r0; the bytes of B containing imm are at address loc. Thus, if loc contains the value 5, then B is the instruction 'addi r0,5'. Instruction A writes the contents of register r1 to address loc, thereby modifying B. When B is executed, the value added to r0 depends on the value written to address loc by A. Thus, the execution of A affects the behavior of B through the act of dynamic code modification, independent of any data or control dependencies that may exist in the program. We refer to dependencies arising in this way due to dynamic code modification as codegen dependencies. More formally: While codegen dependencies resemble data dependencies in some ways, it is different in one fundamental way. If an instruction I is data dependent on an instruction J , then J can change the values used by I , but not the nature of the computation performed by I . By contrast, if I is codegen dependent on J , then J can change the nature of the computation performed by I , e.g., from a bitwise-or instruction to a jump-if-equal instruction as discussed earlier.
DCFG Construction
Algorithm 1 shows how we construct a DCFG from an execution trace. The DCFG consists of a sequence of CFGs {G φ | φ = 0, 1, . . .}, one per phase, linked together by dynamic edges; we refer to the index φ for these CFGs as their phase index.
Given an execution trace T , we proceed as follows. We initialize the phase index φ to 0 and the DCFG G to ∅. The set W of memory locations written in the current phase is initialized to ∅. The CFG G φ is initialized to the empty graph and added to G (line 7). We then iterate through the trace processing each instruction T [i] in turn. If T [i] begins a new phase, we increment the phase index (line 10), reset W to ∅ (since no memory locations have been written in the new phase that has just begun), initialize the CFG V φ for the new phase to the empty graph, and add this new V φ to the DCFG G (lines 10-12). We then process the instruction T [i] in the context of the CFG G φ , as discussed in Section 2 (line 13). At this point, if T [i] is the first instruction of a phase (line 14), it has been added to G φ , which means G φ has a basic block for it, so we add a dynamic edge from the basic block of the last instruction of the previous phase to the basic block of the first instruction of the current phase (line 15). Finally, we update the set of written memory locations by adding in the set of locations written by T [i] (line 16). We then continue the process with the next instruction of T .
Algorithm 1: DCFG Construction
Input: An execution trace T Result: A DCFG G for T 1 function instr_starts_new_phase(Instr, WrittenLocs):
Discussion
The notions of phases, DCFGs, and codegen dependencies, as defined above, refer to an execution trace, and thus to a particular execution of a program. While this suffices for the applications we were motivated by, it naturally raises the question of how they might be extended to encompass multiple execution traces. As a starting point, we note that for programs that do not have dynamic code modification, every execution has a single phase, so the CFG constructed using Algorithm 1 corresponds to a path through its static CFG. For such programs, the CFGs obtained from multiple traces can be merged in a straightforward way.
Dynamic code modification makes things more complex because different executions of the same program can, in the fully general case, modify arbitrary parts of the program and/or give rise to arbitrarily different dynamic code. Specifying a single representation of that program that captures all of the different possible code that can result from different executions seems challenging. It may be possible to identify special cases that encompass real-life software of interest, e.g., JIT compilers or dynamic binary rewriting systems, which do not involve arbitrary and unrestricted kinds of dynamic code modification. Since our motivating applications for this work did not warrant this additional level of complexity, we leave such generalizations as future work.
APPLICATIONS 4.1 Program Slicing for Bug Localization and Exploit Analysis in JIT Compilers
Program slicing refers to identifying instructions that (may) affect, or be affected by, the value computed by an instruction in a program [1, 27, 43] . Slicing can be static or dynamic; and, orthogonally, forward or backward. By eliminating instructions that are provably irrelevant to the computation of interest, slicing reduces the amount of code that has to be examined in order to reason about it.
We implemented backward dynamic slicing as an application for evaluating the efficacy of DCFGs and codegen dependencies for end-to-end reasoning about dynamic code, with the goal of bug localization and exploit analysis in JIT compilers. Backward dynamic slicing aims to identify the set of instructions that may have affected the value of a variable or location at some particular point in a particular execution of the program. Our implementation is based on Korel's algorithm for dynamic slicing of unstructured programs [27] ; however, any slicing algorithm for unstructured programs would have been adequate.
The algorithm, as originally defined, uses the usual notion of data dependencies to find last definition of an instruction's operands: i.e., given an instruction I ≡ T [i] in an execution trace T , the last definition of I is the most recent instruction prior to position i in T such that I is data dependent on J , i.e., J defines some source operand of I . To work with dynamic code, we modified this notion to also take codegen dependencies into account, such that the last definition of an instruction I ≡ T [i] in a trace T is the most recent instruction J prior to I in T such that either (i) I is data dependent on J ; or (ii) I is codegen-dependent on J .
It is important to note that the notion of DCFGs plays a crucial role in providing control flow information needed to construct backward slices. Analyses that reason about dynamic code solely through data dependencies, e.g. using taint propagation [11, 14, 21, 45, 46] are unable to capture the effects of control dependencies and therefore are unsound with respect to slicing.
Detecting Environmental Triggers in Malware
Malware sometimes use environmental triggers to evade detection by performing malicious actions only if the right environmental conditions are met, e.g., if the date has some specific value or when certain keys are typed. Current work on detecting such behaviors is geared towards static code, e.g., identifying conditional branches with input-tainted operands [6] . The idea is to use dynamic taint analysis to identify conditional branches of the form if expr then behavior 1 else behavior 2
where expr is tainted from (i.e., influenced by) some input values. Once such conditionals have been identified, it may be possible to use other techniques, e.g., using SMT solvers to generate alternate inputs, to further explore the program's behavior. The presence of dynamic code potentially opens up other ways to implement environmental triggers, e.g., by using the environmental input to directly affect the instruction bytes generated:
This idea can be illustrated by adapting an example of evasive behavior, described by Brumley et al. [6] , to use dynamic code instead of a straightforward conditional. The code, shown in Figure 3 , uses bit-manipulation instead of conditionals to evaluate the trigger expression, thereby rendering inapplicable techniques that rely on tainted conditionals. The variable day_bits is set to 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the most significant bit of the value of the expression day-9 is 0, i.e., whether or not the predicate day ≥ 9 is true. Similarly, mth_bits is 1 or 0 depending on whether or not month ≥ 7 is true. Thus, the variable trigger is 1 or 0 depending on whether the environmental trigger-in this example, the predicate day ≥ 9 && month ≥ 7-is true or not. The assignment to *(addInstrPtr+11) then writes this value into the source byte of an assignment to a variable that is used in a conditional to determine whether the malicious behavior is manifested. Note that the conditional that controls the execution of the payload() function is neither data-dependent nor control-dependent on the input; instead there is a codegen dependency between this conditional and the patching instructions, which are data dependent on the input.
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EVALUATION 5.1 Overview
We built a prototype implementation to evaluate the efficacy of our ideas. We used Intel's Pin software (version 3.7) [28] for program instrumentation and collecting instruction-level execution traces; and XED (version 8.20.0) [23] for instruction decoding. We iterate over the instruction trace to construct a DCFG for the execution. We identify dynamic code as follows. We use our own tainting library during construction of our DCFGs to determine code-gen dependencies: we taint writes to memory, with each memory write getting a distinct taint label. For each instruction in the trace we check whether any of its instruction bytes is tainted, in which case the instruction is flagged as dynamic.
We ran our experiments on a machine with 32 cores (@ 3.30 Ghz) and 1 terabyte of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04. We used both synthetic and real-world examples for our evaluation, and compared our results with three widely-used modern dynamic analysis tools that implement backwards slicing, namely: PinPlay [34] (revision 1.29), angr [39, 42] (commit bd3c6d8 on github), and Triton [38] (build number 1397), to see whether the slices they computed captured the buggy JIT-compiler code. For these experiments, we invoked these tools to incorporate support for self-modifying code as follows: we set the flags smc_support and smc_strict flags to true for PinPlay, and loaded our project with auto_load_libs and support_selfmodifying_code set to true for angr.
Slicing

Soundness.
A sound slicing algorithm does not exclude any statement that can influence the slicing criterion. In our case, this means that given some observed behavior in dynamic code that is the result of some logic in the code that performs the dynamic code generation, a sound slicing algorithm should be able to identify the connection between the observed behavior in the dynamically generated code and the culprit code in the dynamic code generator. The first example, shown in Figure 4(a) , is a small program written in x86 assembly code. 1 The instruction tagged as 'Gen1' in Figure 4 (a) performs dynamic code modification by adding the contents of register %cl to the memory location with address given by 1(%rdx). The operand of the instruction tagged 'Dyn1' is modified as a result. The instructions Gen1 and Dyn1 both occur in a loop, with Dyn1 being the backward conditional jump at the end of each iteration of the loop. When this program is executed, Gen1 repeatedly dynamically modifies the offset for the backward jump of the loop, so that the target of the jump changes with each iteration, until eventually it turns into a forward jump whose target is outside the loop. An examination of the execution trace of this program shows that Gen1 writes to the second byte of Dyn1, inducing a codegen dependency from Dyn1 to Gen1. Each time we encounter Dyn1 after it has been modified in this way we get a new phase.
The second example, shown in Figure 4(b) , is taken from an online discussion forum [4] . It has a function AddTwo() that returns the value obtained by adding 2 to its integer argument. The instruction that performs this addition, tagged as 'Dyn2' in Figure 4(b) , is modified at runtime to change the value added to the argument from 2 to 3. The instruction that performs this dynamic code modification is tagged 'Gen2'. Thus, Dyn2 is codegen dependent on Gen2. This example has two phases, with a new phase being generated upon encountering the new version of Dyn2 after it is patched.
We used our backwards slicing implementation, discussed in Section 4.1, on these examples for an initial evaluation of our program representation. In each case, we computed a backward dynamic slice from the dynamic code: namely, the last instance of the instructions labeled Dyn1 and Dyn2 as discussed above. In both cases the slice criteria included the dynamic instruction modified for both examples, respectively. We found that, in both cases, the slices so computed contained the instructions that modify/write dynamic code. Codegen dependencies and DCFGs play a crucial role in this: for example, the instruction Gen2 in the second example is explicitly picked up due to a codegen dependency from the patched instruction Dyn2. There are no data or control dependencies between the instructions Gen2 and Dyn2, so traditional dependencies alone would not have been sufficient to pick up the code that does the dynamic code modification.
To assess the current state of the art in analysis of dynamic code, we used three popular dynamic analysis tools: PinPlay, angr, and Triton, to compute backward dynamic slices on the results computed by these programs. These results are summarized in Table tab :precision. Our experiments indicate that (1) the CFGs constructed by these tools do not represent the different versions of code resulting from dynamic code modification; and (2) while all three tools successfully included all of the relevant non-codegendependent instructions in the slices they computed, none of them are able to pick up the code that performs dynamic modification.
Real World Examples:
To evaluate our approach on real world software that uses dynamic code, we consider three example applications: (1) analysis of exploits involving JIT code; (2) bug localization in JIT compilers; and (3) detection of trigger-based evasive behaviors that use dynamic code. Our goal was to perform endto-end analyses on these examples, i.e., start from the problematic dynamic code and compute a backward dynamic slice that includes portions of the dynamic code generator where the bug/security exploit originates. The results are shown in Table 1 [35] ; and (3) malicious bytecode used to escape a LuaJIT sandbox [9] .
We analyzed each of these exploits as follows. We used the proof-ofconcept code to compute a DCFG/backward dynamic slice starting from the dynamically generated exploit code. Separately, we examined the write ups for each of the exploits to determine the bugs responsible for each exploit, identifying the buggy code generator portions in the execution traces recorded for each exploit. We then checked the slice to determine whether the buggy generator code is present in the slice.
The first security exploit we consider entails an OOB write to the JIT code pages within Google's V8 JavaScript engine [10] . The exploit is a result of array type ambiguity, which allows for the author to construct a non-linear overflow with which to write and execute arbitrary shell code. The original author demonstrated this by launching xcalc. We modified the same exploit so that the shellcode instead encounters a divide-by-zero exception to aide in identifying the dynamic code in the execution trace. We used D8 to invoke the V8 JavaScript engine from the command line, obtained an execution trace using Pin, and then constructed a DCFG along with a backward dynamic slice from the first nop shellcode instruction that appears in the nop sled immediately before the divide-by-zero exception. Our backward slice successfully included both the buggy code within V8 that led to the array type ambiguity along with the instructions that actually generated the shellcode at runtime.
The second exploit we examined is discussed in detail by Rabet [35] . It arises out of a bug in V8's escape analysis and causes some variable initializations in the JIT-optimized code to be incorrectly optimized away when performing load reduction. The proof-ofconcept code provided causes V8 to crash while executing the optimized dynamic code due to an OOB read. The write up provided by Rabet proceeds to use this OOB read as a stepping stone towards demonstrating arbitrary code execution. For our analysis of this example, we built our DCFG from the execution trace recorded by Pin and then we computed a backward dynamic slice from the dynamic instruction prior to the exception that is thrown due to the OOB read. We found that the resulting slice correctly included the buggy portions of the load reducer in the escape analysis phase of V8's JIT compiler, whose optimizations cause the OOB read.
Our final example in this category was with malicious Lua bytecode being used to escape a sandbox in LuaJIT [9] . The proof of concept malicious program corrupts bytecode with the goal of writing shellcode which prints a message. We followed an approach similar to the one we used to slice the V8 OOB write, starting our slice at the beginning of the NOP sled used in the attack. We found that the backward slice computed by our tool correctly picks up the Lua code that generates the shellcode.
In summary, using our approach we are able to compute backward slices starting at some problematic dynamically created instruction(s) and working back to identify the JIT compiler logic that created that instruction. Our slices make use of our DCFGs when determining removable instructions, allowing for multiple versions of dynamic instructions to be reasoned about separately. Furthermore, the addition of code-gen dependencies from our DCFGs allow for our backward slices to reason about dependencies between the code that does the dynamic modification and the dynamically generated code itself. This can be the starting point for further analysis, e.g., the slice can be used to determine where and how the shellcode for the exploit is crafted, whether or not the bytecode was corrupted during execution, etc. Such explorations are facilitated by the ability to obtain program slices that contain (a) all versions of the dynamic code executed; and (b) the code that generates the dynamic code, linked explicitly through codegen dependencies.
To better understand how well current approaches apply to such analysis problems, we also used these examples to experiment with PinPlay, angr, and Triton. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
b. Bug Localization:
We consider three JIT compiler bugs from Google's V8 JavaScript engine that were posted to bugs.chromium.org and classified as "Type: Bug-Security. "
(1) Empty jump tables generated by the bytecode generator leading to out-of-bound reads that cause the generated JITcompiled to crash (Issue 794825) [17] . (2) A type confusion bug that leads to a crash after the dynamic code has been generated (Issue 794822) [18] . (3) Arrow function scope fixing bug, where the system cannot handle certain constructs involving a single line arrow function, resulting in a crash (Issue 807096) [19] .
For each of these bugs we proceeded as follows. To identify the problematic code in the JIT compiler, we examined the corresponding GitHub commits, together with any relevant information in the bug report, to determine the code that was changed to fix the bug. We delineated the problem code so identified using small "marker code snippets"-i.e., small easily identifiable code snippets that do not affect the operation of the JIT compiler-and confirmed that the behavior of the buggy JIT compiler was unaffected. We then used the example code submitted with the bug report to obtain an execution trace demonstrating the bug, and used this trace, together with the DCFG constructed from it, to compute a backward dynamic slice starting from the instruction that crashed. Finally, we analyzed the resulting slice to determine whether the problematic code, as identified above, was included in the slice. The results of our experiments are summarized in Table 1 . Our end-to-end analysis was able to successfully pick up the buggy code for each of the bugs mentioned above in the slice, allowing one to narrow down the functions involved in V8 that lead to the crash.
To assess the efficacy of current state-of-the-art program analysis tools on these examples, we experimented with same dynamic analysis toolkits considered earlier, namely, PinPlay, angr, and Triton. None of them were able to successfully analyze the examples involving V8: they all crashed with internal errors when loading V8. All three tools were able to process the LuaJIT example without crashing, but none of the slices they computed contained the JIT-compiler or exploit code that created the dynamic code. Table 2 shows the performance of our prototype DCFG-based slicing implementation on our real-world test inputs (the environmental trigger example is omitted because it does not use backward slicing). These input programs all involve computations of substantial size: the smallest, LuaJIT exploit, has a trace of 464K instructions, while the remaining execution traces range from almost 7.9M instructions (V8 scoping issue bug) to 135M instructions (V8 escape analysis bug). The time taken to read the traces (and do nothing else) is roughly 1M instructions/sec. 2 The DCFGs constructed typically range in size from about 22K basic blocks and 62K edges (V8 scoping issue bug) to about 41K blocks and 117K edges (V8 OOB exploit), with a low of 4.6K blocks and 12K edges for the LuaJIT exploit and a high of about 53K blocks and 154K edges for the V8 escape analysis bug. Most of our test programs have 2−4 phases, with the V8 JIT type confusion example an outlier with 9 phases. DCFG construction incurs an overhead of roughly 15× over simply reading a trace: most of the test inputs take roughly 2−3 minutes, with the lowest time being 7.5 seconds for the LuaJIT exploit and the highest being about 30 minutes for the V8 escape analysis bug. Since DCFG construction involves processing each instruction in the execution trace, the time taken depends on the sizes of both the instruction trace and the DCFG.
Performance.
The overhead incurred by slicing relative to the time taken for DCFG construction ranges from 1.04× for the LuaJIT exploit to 9.5× for the V8 scoping issue bug, with most of the test programs ranging from 3× to 6×. In absolute terms, most of the programs take about 2 − 10 minutes for slicing, with a low of about 8 secs for the LuaJIT example and a high of about about 2.8 hours for the V8 escape analysis bug. Slicing is able to remove about 50%-60% of the instructions in the DCFG, with a high of 71% of the instructions removed for the LuaJIT exploit. These results are further improved by excluding code that is irrelevant to the JIT-compiler, i.e., the front-end parser, byte-code generator, and interpreter. These numbers indicate that our approach is both practical (in terms of time) and useful (in terms of the amount of code removed from the DCFG). Since our approach does not fundamentally alter the slicing algorithm, but rather augments it to work over DCFGs and use codegen dependencies, it is not difficult to adapt our approach to other slicing algorithms with different cost-precision characteristics.
Finally, an important aspect of usability is that of scalability. This is especially crucial for dynamic analyses, since the complexity of real-world software that use dynamic code, combined with the fact that they are often multi-threaded, means that instruction traces can become quite large. In this context, we note that our prototype implementation, which was built without any particular attention to performance, is nevertheless resonably scalable and is able to handle computations of considerable size on software of real-world complexity (e.g., a trace of 135M instructions from a widely-used JavaScript engine, corresponding to a CFG containing some 53K basic blocks and 245K instructions).
As noted in Section 3.1.2, a naive implementation of DCFGs can lead to DCFG components being replicated across multiple phases, resulting in a lot of of wasted memory. Our implementation of DCFGs avoids such replication by associating a set of phase numbers with each instruction, basic block, and edge in the DCFG; our slicing algorithm is modified to avoid following unrealizable paths in the DCFG. For the real-world benchmarks we tested, this results in a savings of about 18% in DCFG size (no. of basic blocks).
5.2.3
Focusing the analysis: markers and dicing. Given the overall objective of localizing problems in the culprit JIT-compiler code, it is useful to examine the extent to which our approach is able to reduce the amount of actual JIT-compiler code that has to be considered: for example, a slice that excludes much of the frontend parser and interpreter, but includes the entirety of the JIT compiler, would not be very useful. To evaluate this, we repeated our experiments to focus the our evaluation, as much as possible, on the JIT-compiler portion of the system. To do this, we placed markersi.e., small code snippets that are unambiguously identifiable and semantically neutral-in the code as close as we were able to the invocation of the JIT compiler. During analysis, we excluded the portion of the execution trace before the marker. computed a program dice that excluded the front-end parser, bytecode generator, and interpreter. Table 3 gives the results of these experiments. The two columns labeled 'Original' refer to the size of the DCFG and the backward slice computed without markers, i.e., as shown in Table 2 ; the columns labeled 'Dicing' refer to the size of the DCFG and slice when markers are used; the columns labeled 'Improvement' show the percentage improvement due to dicing. The columns labeled ∆ DCFG and ∆ slice show, respectively, the reductions in the size of the DCFG and the slice when irrelevant code is excluded. These are in the range 35%-85% for DCFG size and 26%-84% for slice size. The JIT Type Confusion bug sample is an outlier, with almost all of the original DCFG and slice eliminated. The final column, labeled ∆ mk , shows the effects of slicing focusing only on the DCFG resulting from dicing: these range from about 43% to about 82%. Overall, these results show that (1) our approach is effective in focusing on the relevant portions of the JIT compiler; and (2) the use of code markers to identify entry into the JIT compiler can be helpful in zeroing in on the relevant portions of the code being analyzed.
Detecting Environmental Triggers
Our implementation to detect environment-dependent dynamic code relies on the fact that there must be a codegen dependency from code that is data or control dependent on some environmental value to some code that is dynamically generated. We first collect an execution trace and build our program representation. Next, we taint the input source and propagate the taint forward. If, at any point, we find a codegen dependency from an instruction with tainted operands to an instruction that is later executed, it means that an input-dependent value may be influencing the instruction bytes of some dynamic instruction. In this case, we report that there is dynamic input-dependent program behavior.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, data dependencies alone may not suffice for reasoning about information flow in dynamic code. We demonstrate this using a variant of the previous example but uses an implicit flow to propagate the value of the environmental trigger; the implicit flow code, shown in Figure 5 , is based on an example from Cavallaro et al. [8] . To analyze this example, we compute a backward dynamic slice with the slicing criterion being the dynamically modified code location at the point where it is executed. This slice correctly includes the environmental triggers, indicating that the code modification is influenced by environmental triggers. The slice also includes the relevant portion of the implicit flow code, therey demonstrating the utility of the control flow information obtained from the DCFG. In practice, one might use forward slicing from the point where triggers are evaluated to determine whether any dynamically generated code is in the slice. However, our point here is not so much one of the directionality of the computed slice, but rather to demonstrate the sophistication of analyses possible when reasoning about dynamic code using control flow information, available in DCFGs, together with codegen dependencies.
Our implementation correctly detects that environmental values influence dynamic program behavior for the examples shown in Figures 3 and 5. When tested with S2E, a widely used symbolic execution engine, we found that the input values used to patch the function hide() are silently concretized and only the false path is explored. The popular analysis tool angr gave a similar result.
The role of codegen dependencies
Program slices are not guaranteed, in general, to be minimal. This means that it is possible, in theory, for an instruction in the slice to be included due to imprecision in the slicing algorithm. To determine whether imprecision may have played a role in the results reported above, we re-ran our slicing tool on each of the examples discussed above with a directive to ignore codegen dependencies.
For the exploit examples discussed above, our slices were computed starting at a NOP instruction in the NOP sled generated as part of the shellcode. For each example, ignoring codegen dependencies resulted in the computation of a slice consisting of just the NOP instruction itself and nothing else. By contrast, when codegen dependencies were included as part of the slice computation, the relevant JIT-compiler code was included in the slice. This demonstrates that codegen dependencies play a crucial role in the computation of the slice linking the shellcode to the code that generated it.
For the bug localization examples, we found that the JIT compiler code was included in the slice even with codegen dependencies turned off. We are currently working on determining whether this is due to legitimate dependencies in these computations or whether this is due to imprecision in our slicing algorithm.
Evaluation Results: Summary
The results from our experimental evaluation demonstrate the utility of DCFGs and codegen dependencies for end-to-end analysis of dynamic code. In particular, we show the following:
(1) Backward analyses, augmented with the notion of codegen dependencies and extended to work over DCFGs, can effectively work back from specific behaviors in JIT-compiled code to the logic in the JIT compiler that resulted in the generation of that code. (2) Forward analyses, augmented with the notion of codegen dependencies and extended to work over DCFGs, can identify dynamic code that has been affected by environmental triggers in the course of dynamic code generation. (3) Our implementation of backward dynamic slicing is practical, in terms of analysis time; useful, in terms of the amount of code removed from the DCFG; and scalable, in terms of being able to handle analyses of significant size involving complex real-world software.
Experiments with three widely-used dynamic analysis toolkits that implement backward dynamic slicing. show that these tools cannot work back from observed behaviors in dynamically generated code to the relevant code in the dynamic code generator. Finally, for the identification trigger-based behaviors in dynamic code, current tools based on stock symbolic execution are not able to fully detect or explore all possible paths in the dynamic code modifier, while current tools based on whole-system taint analysis are not able to handle implicit information flows.
RELATED WORK
There is a large body of literature on program slicing (e.g., see [27, 36, 41, 44, 47] ), but to the best of our knowledge all of this work focuses on static code. There is also a significant amount of research on various aspects of JIT compilation, including implementation [3, 5, 16, 37] and taint analysis in the JITted code [14, 25, 30, 37] . None of these works consider analyses that capture dependencies between the JITted code and the code in the JIT compiler.
There is a lot of work on dependence and information flow analyses (e.g., see [20, 24, 32] ), but these typically do not consider end-toend analysis of dynamic code. Several authors have discussed taint propagation in JIT-compiled code, but focusing on taint propagation in just the application code rather than on end-to-end analyses [14, 25, 30, 37 ]. Whole-system analyses [11, 14, 21, 45, 46] focus on issues relating to dynamic taint propagation through the entire computer system. Such systems provide end-to-end analyses but typically consider only explicit information flows (≃ data dependencies), not implicit flows (≃ control dependencies); they are thus of limited use for reasoning about behaviors, such as conditional dynamic code modification (i.e., where the dynamic code generated may depend conditionally on input and/or environmental values), which are common in applications such as JIT compilers.
Korczynski and Yin discuss identifying code reuse/injections using whole-system dynamic taint analysis [26] . While this work captures codegen dependencies, it does not propose a program representation that can capture the code structure for the different phases that arise during execution. As a result, this approach is not suitable for analyses, such as program slicing, that require information about the control flow structure of the code. Dalla Preda et al. describe a notion of phases to characterize the semantics of self-modifying code [12] . The technical details of their work are very different from ours. Debray and Patel suggest using a notion similar to our codegen dependencies to identify dynamic code unpackers [13] , but focus exclusively on code unpacking (e.g., do not consider applications such as bug localization or environmental triggers), consider only relatively small malware samples, and do not address the complexities of large systems such as V8.
There are a number of systems that reason about program behavior using dynamic analysis, and therefore are able to perform some kinds of analysis on dynamic code; examples include PinPlay [34] , angr [39, 42] , and Triton [38] . Our experiments indicate that these systems do not keep track of multiple versions of code resulting from dynamic code modification, and as a result cannot fully capture all of the dependencies arising from runtime code changes.
Cai et al. [7] and Myreen [29] discuss reasoning about dynamic code for the purposes of program verification using Hoare logic. We have not seen any implementations to apply their work towards modern software that utilizes dynamic code (i.e. a javascript engine). Furthermore, our work is more specific in that we seek to provide a program representation capable of representing dynamic code.
CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic code is ubiquitous in today's world and raises its own set of security challenges. Existing approaches to program analysis are not adequate for reasoning about the behavior of dynamic code due to two main challenges: first, current program representations do not adequately capture the effects of changes due to dynamic code modification; second, they do not account for dependencies that can arise due to the act of dynamic code modification. This paper discusses how these challenges can be addressed via a program representation suitable for dynamic code as well as a new notion of dependencies that can capture dependencies between the dynamic code and the code that generated it. Experiments with a prototype implementation of backwards dynamic slicing based on these ideas show, on a number of real-world examples, that these ideas make it possible to work back from the faulty code to the JIT compiler logic that led to the generation of the faulty code.
